THE POLISH SEJM RESOLUTION ON VOLYN - IN SEARCH OF A MOSCOW TRAIL
Recent official recognition of tragic events of 1943 in Volyn "a genocide" by the Polish Sejm has expectedly caused a storm of indignation throughout Ukraine. And worth noting, that I has been shocked by a level of infantilism, which has been demonstrated by some Ukrainians in their comments regarding this decision. In general, this kind of opinions "from the net" has a wide spectrum: from attempts to blame Poles in total pro-Moscow position to searchings of a "Kremlin's factor of influence" on such the Sejm's decision.
It's quite understandable, that Moscow is really interested in incitement of animosity between Ukraine and Poland. Nevertheless, it would be truly unreasonable to search a "Moscow's trail" on this resolution by the Polish parliament. This is unfounded, same as to blame the current Polish government and society in total Ukrainophobia. In fact, the situation is far more complex.
First of all the Sejm's decision on the Volyn tragedy is a response of the Polish deputies on public requests. There is a joint consensus in the Polish society on the events of Second World War, including on the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts of this period. First of all the Sejm's decision on the Volyn tragedy is a response of the Polish deputies on public requests. There is a joint consensus in the Polish society on the events of Second World War, including on the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts of this period. This consesus is very one-sided, al least we can recall on demonization of a historical image of Stepan Bandera, who, worth noting, had been imprisoned by Germans in that period. This is the current order of things which has to be taken into account. However, the fact that an ordinary Pole believes that Ukrainians were responsible for what had happened in Volyn doesn't make him an Ukrainephobe in general. The spectrum is wider. Based on the aforementioned historical event the average Pole could have a pathological hatred to the Ukrainian nationalists. Other one could be a supporter of deepening of Ukrainian-Polish relations due to his a sympathy to today's Ukraine. Moreover, some Poles can understand and accept the position of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement of the WW2, but still believe that the Ukrainian nationalists were "more guilty" in that situation.
Before express their outrage regarding modern historical mythology of Poles those outrage Ukrainian have to ask themselves about how much work was done to change the vector of this mythology towards the Ukrainian position on the WW2 for further development a common position on it. A number of rhetorical questions appears on this matter. How many Polish historians, philosophers, publicists, journalists have been nominated for receiving Ukrainian grants? How many Polish students are studying at historical departments of Ukrainian universities? How many pro-Ukrainian informational recourses have been founded in Poland? How many historical movies with Ukrainian positions of the events of the WW2 have been produced? Or, at least, what kind of work at this area has been dome by the Ukrainian security services? After all, the process of regaining the Ukrainian centered position on our history of that period just has been launched after years of living under the post-Soviet historical-cultural paradigm.
It is clear, that by following the way of deepening and legislative fixation of its own historical mythology the Polish government doesn't aims to take anti-Ukrainian steps, but to strengthen the Polish society as well as to enhance its own legitimacy. On the contrary we can conclude, that current Polish government has clearly pro-Ukrainian position and it has proven it through a number of distinct political gestures. Moreover, we could hardly blame the official Warsaw in pro-Moscow orientation. On the contrary - its anti-Kremlin position is one of the factors that promotes to deepening of friendship with Kyiv. Ukraine could be an advantageous ally for Poland not only in terms of confrontation with Moscow, but also with Brussels/Berlin as well as in terms of strengthening the overall geopolitical subjectivity of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, official Kyiv hasn't shown its interest neither in the first, nor in the second yet.
Since the election of new Polish president, parliament and the government formation official Kyiv's position on the initiatives on creating the Baltic-Black Sea Union is very close to sabotage. Moreover, some steps taken by the current Ukrainian authorities could be regarded as hostile to Warsaw.
Analyzing the current situation in Ukrainian-Polish relations a Ukrainian politologist Oleksandr Maslak focuses on two personnel decisions made by official Kyiv. The first was the appointment of Andriy Deshitsa as a Ukraine's Ambassador in Poland, and the second is an "import" of odious Polish politician Leszek Balcerowicz by the current Ukrainian government (since April he is a representative of Ukraine's president in the Cabinet of Ministers): "Even before the official appointed to the post of ambassador in Poland Deshitsa made a number of negative comments towards the current polish government and after he has took the post Deshitsa did a lot to deterioration of the situation. In his turn Baltserovich is known as a sharp oppositionist to the current government and the President of Poland." To clarify the situation this step could be compared with appointment of a Ukrainian politician from the Yanukovych's clan to a post in the Polish government.
So now we have the following situation - official Kyiv openly ignores the Warsaw's integrational initiatives; moreover, the Ukrainian authorities continue to work in the Brussels/Berlin vector. This is no wonder, that the Polish government made the aforementioned decision, which, in addition is profitable for it in the short term (however, this step is rather ill-considered in the long term).
So what those Ukrainians who clearly realize the importance of integration processes in Central and Eastern Europe have to do? First of all we have to stop blame the circumstances and start to create positive precedents.
As long as there are no political elites, which would ensure the implementation of foreign policy in accordance with the national interests the Ukrainian non-government organizations have engane diplomacy at non-state level and continue to develop the integrational ideology. One of the important areas such diplomacy - cooperation between the nationalist and conservative forces of Ukraine and Poland. The first serious steps in this case has already been taken. Hrer could be mentioned the recent constituent conference of the group of promotion the development of the Baltic-Black Sea Union (2-3 July), initiated by the Azov movement. The conference was attended by the Polish military attache, even despite its non-governmental character and this is quite significant gesture. This indicates the next things: first it proves that Poland continues its attempts for rapprochement with Ukraine; secondly - growth of nationalist attitudes throughout Ukraine isn't an obstacle to this.
From the above the following could be concluded, that now we have to do all possible at the level of public and non-government organisations to compensate for the lack of adequate public policy by the government. Indeed it's much more difficult more difficult than conduct discussions of a "Moscow trail" in the facebook, but this is what our national interests require now!
It's quite understandable, that Moscow is really interested in incitement of animosity between Ukraine and Poland. Nevertheless, it would be truly unreasonable to search a "Moscow's trail" on this resolution by the Polish parliament. This is unfounded, same as to blame the current Polish government and society in total Ukrainophobia. In fact, the situation is far more complex.
First of all the Sejm's decision on the Volyn tragedy is a response of the Polish deputies on public requests. There is a joint consensus in the Polish society on the events of Second World War, including on the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts of this period. First of all the Sejm's decision on the Volyn tragedy is a response of the Polish deputies on public requests. There is a joint consensus in the Polish society on the events of Second World War, including on the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts of this period. This consesus is very one-sided, al least we can recall on demonization of a historical image of Stepan Bandera, who, worth noting, had been imprisoned by Germans in that period. This is the current order of things which has to be taken into account. However, the fact that an ordinary Pole believes that Ukrainians were responsible for what had happened in Volyn doesn't make him an Ukrainephobe in general. The spectrum is wider. Based on the aforementioned historical event the average Pole could have a pathological hatred to the Ukrainian nationalists. Other one could be a supporter of deepening of Ukrainian-Polish relations due to his a sympathy to today's Ukraine. Moreover, some Poles can understand and accept the position of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement of the WW2, but still believe that the Ukrainian nationalists were "more guilty" in that situation.
Before express their outrage regarding modern historical mythology of Poles those outrage Ukrainian have to ask themselves about how much work was done to change the vector of this mythology towards the Ukrainian position on the WW2 for further development a common position on it. A number of rhetorical questions appears on this matter. How many Polish historians, philosophers, publicists, journalists have been nominated for receiving Ukrainian grants? How many Polish students are studying at historical departments of Ukrainian universities? How many pro-Ukrainian informational recourses have been founded in Poland? How many historical movies with Ukrainian positions of the events of the WW2 have been produced? Or, at least, what kind of work at this area has been dome by the Ukrainian security services? After all, the process of regaining the Ukrainian centered position on our history of that period just has been launched after years of living under the post-Soviet historical-cultural paradigm.
It is clear, that by following the way of deepening and legislative fixation of its own historical mythology the Polish government doesn't aims to take anti-Ukrainian steps, but to strengthen the Polish society as well as to enhance its own legitimacy. On the contrary we can conclude, that current Polish government has clearly pro-Ukrainian position and it has proven it through a number of distinct political gestures. Moreover, we could hardly blame the official Warsaw in pro-Moscow orientation. On the contrary - its anti-Kremlin position is one of the factors that promotes to deepening of friendship with Kyiv. Ukraine could be an advantageous ally for Poland not only in terms of confrontation with Moscow, but also with Brussels/Berlin as well as in terms of strengthening the overall geopolitical subjectivity of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, official Kyiv hasn't shown its interest neither in the first, nor in the second yet.
Since the election of new Polish president, parliament and the government formation official Kyiv's position on the initiatives on creating the Baltic-Black Sea Union is very close to sabotage. Moreover, some steps taken by the current Ukrainian authorities could be regarded as hostile to Warsaw.
Analyzing the current situation in Ukrainian-Polish relations a Ukrainian politologist Oleksandr Maslak focuses on two personnel decisions made by official Kyiv. The first was the appointment of Andriy Deshitsa as a Ukraine's Ambassador in Poland, and the second is an "import" of odious Polish politician Leszek Balcerowicz by the current Ukrainian government (since April he is a representative of Ukraine's president in the Cabinet of Ministers): "Even before the official appointed to the post of ambassador in Poland Deshitsa made a number of negative comments towards the current polish government and after he has took the post Deshitsa did a lot to deterioration of the situation. In his turn Baltserovich is known as a sharp oppositionist to the current government and the President of Poland." To clarify the situation this step could be compared with appointment of a Ukrainian politician from the Yanukovych's clan to a post in the Polish government.
So now we have the following situation - official Kyiv openly ignores the Warsaw's integrational initiatives; moreover, the Ukrainian authorities continue to work in the Brussels/Berlin vector. This is no wonder, that the Polish government made the aforementioned decision, which, in addition is profitable for it in the short term (however, this step is rather ill-considered in the long term).
So what those Ukrainians who clearly realize the importance of integration processes in Central and Eastern Europe have to do? First of all we have to stop blame the circumstances and start to create positive precedents.
As long as there are no political elites, which would ensure the implementation of foreign policy in accordance with the national interests the Ukrainian non-government organizations have engane diplomacy at non-state level and continue to develop the integrational ideology. One of the important areas such diplomacy - cooperation between the nationalist and conservative forces of Ukraine and Poland. The first serious steps in this case has already been taken. Hrer could be mentioned the recent constituent conference of the group of promotion the development of the Baltic-Black Sea Union (2-3 July), initiated by the Azov movement. The conference was attended by the Polish military attache, even despite its non-governmental character and this is quite significant gesture. This indicates the next things: first it proves that Poland continues its attempts for rapprochement with Ukraine; secondly - growth of nationalist attitudes throughout Ukraine isn't an obstacle to this.
From the above the following could be concluded, that now we have to do all possible at the level of public and non-government organisations to compensate for the lack of adequate public policy by the government. Indeed it's much more difficult more difficult than conduct discussions of a "Moscow trail" in the facebook, but this is what our national interests require now!
By Igor Zagrebelny
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