A DEAD END OF THE SERBIAN MOSCOWPHILIA

Negative attitude towards the EU integration continue to prevail in the Serbian society, including its younger part. Recent polls have shown that more than half of young Serbs are against the EU joining. Eurooptimists are blatantly confused on this occasion. "The recent polls in Serbia on the country's European future is breaking stereotypes and shocking at the same time. The most skeptical attitude to the perspectives of the EU joining was shown not by the representatives older generation, which is traditionally considered as most conservative, nationalist and less willing to change, but youth. About 51% of Serbs aged 18 to 29 are advocating their country to reject the EU integration course, recall Serbia is an official candidate for EU membership." - Nemanja Rujevic and Daniel Bilyk are expressing their surprise in the article "Serbia's Eurosceptic future: youth against the EU joining."


And there is nothing to wonder. Their neighbours Croats demonstrated quite ambiguous to the EU integration at the referendum on 2012. Recall, then 66.27% of the voters have voted "yes," while 33.13% voted against joining the EU; worth noting that the voter turnout was low - 43.51%. However, considering this figures we have to take into account that at that time the EU integration was a priority course for Ivo Josipovic government, and it goes without saying, that the Croatian EU sceptics were in obviously unfavorable informational field. Theyr (EU-sceptics) positions had also been weakened by those fact, that the idea of joining the EU had been officially supported by leadership of the Croatian Church and this factor played a significant role there given the level of public confidence in the Church.

In general, the phenomenon of Euroscepticism has a significant number of supporters throughout Europe despite the EU populist attractiveness. There are people, who look warily towards the Brussels policy, since there are a number of threats behind it to a nation's moral values and a sate sovereignty, as well as risks it usually bears to the economy (especially for small-scale production). As regards Serbia, here is a number of local features in addition to above noted well-founded fears. Some particular actions of the US and its West European allies over the past two and a half decades have contributed to the crystallization of radical anti-Western sentiment in the Serbian society. Definitely, the reluctance to do away with the great-Yugoslav past is quite unreasonable, but at the same time the situation with Kosovo can rightly be regarded as a manifestation of cynical partiality towards Serbs by the West. After all, the land of Kosovo and Metohija has essential historical value for Serbs as an ancient center of the Serbian religion and nationhood, which has been formed in many year confrontation with Islamic invaders. However, the Serbian anti-Western sentiments are closely intertwined with strange phenomenon of Moscowphilia that often gains clearly phantasmagoric features.

Despite the fact that Serbia could be rightfully called a leader by the level of anti-EU sentiments among its citizens in Central-East Europe in general, however, the ideological background of their euroscepticism is utterly prospectless. As an alternative we can look at Croatia and the Visegrad Four countries, who convert their euroscepticism into a balanced policy of regional integration. Official Warsaw, Budapest, Zagreb, Bratislava and Prague hasn't done drastic steps to leave the EU, at the same time they openly demonstrate the courage to go against the will of Brussels (Paris and Berlin) and gradually approach to forming their own geopolitical block. In contrast, today's political realities of Serbia are causing compassion: on the one hand there are spineless political elites, mostly focused on execution of the West's political will; on the other -  excessive and unwarranted hopes on Moscow. Certainly, proceeding from their own benefits the Kremlin could provide episodic protection and support for Serbia, but this will never compensates for the absence of reliable partners in the region.

Against this background, interesting to consider the involvement of Serbia in the project of Intermarium hypothetically.

The very first obstacle to Serbia's integration to the Intermarium is the nature of Serbo-Croatian relations. As of today, Croatia is an is an important member of Central European integration process, and its charming president Kolinda Grabar-Kytarovich shows great enthusiasm on this matter. At the same time there are still a shaft of hatred between the Croatian and Serbian people. And there are many historical reasons for its existence, such as the unjust policy the Serbian government had implemented towards Croats in the interwar times; Serbo-Croatian conflicts of the WW2 period and clearly anti-Croatian policy by communist Yugoslavia. However the events of 20-25 years ago have became the biggest catalyst of enmity between two nations. For Croatian people the fact that they succeeded in arms to defend their independence has became an essential element of a political identity. In this case we have the phenomenon of resentment in its classic form combined with historical memory of atrocities and banditry the Serbian soldiers had committed in the war time. In parallel, in addition to offended national dignity Serbs have got thousands of displaced from the so-called "Serbian Krajina." As we know deportees are one of the main triggers for incitement revanchist sentiments and ethnic hatred.

At the same time Belgrad has quite close political ties with Budapest. In the case if a political force, which will be skeptical about EU integration and will not fall into blind Moscowphilia at the same time, would come to power in Serbia, that could open a posibility for the country to enter the Intermarium geopolitical space within the fairway of Budapest's policy. However, the implementation of such scenario is be possible even in the case if Serbia will become the EU member. It is about the repeat of the Croatian scenario, when EU-oriented policy by the government led to significant growing of social discontent, which eventually resulted into drastic political changes in favor of strengthening of national sovereignty. Also it is necessary to consider that Brussels has already badly burnt on such countries as Poland, Croatia and Hungary, and this reduces Serbia's chances to repeat the abovementioned. 

Another promising direction for the country within the Intermarium concept could be its rapprochement with Romania and Bulgaria. Since we're talking about hypothetical things, it would be appropriate to note the risks of strengthening Moscow-oriented sentiments in these two countries because that woukd be a serious challenge for the Intermarium.

It would be also interesting to look at possible ways of Serbo-Croatian mutual understanding as well as at "reset" of the Serbian public consciousness as a whole in the context of a particular scenario of the country's inclusion into the Intermarium project.

The first bridges of Serbo-Croatian mutual understanding are building now, and into this process is involved mostly the nationalist youth (oriented on the New Right ideological model) of both countries. Yes, it is a bit marginal phenomenon now, but it has the potential to increase the social weight. It is well known that the presence of a common enemy is one of the best rapprochement factors. Thus, Serbs and Croats have one more reason to step towards each other. Finally, we can talk about the possibility of creating a new geopolitical and civilizational matrix. It would be quite benefical to reactualize of the Serbian historical experience of the early modern time when Serbs were integrated into the space of Middle Europe as an outpost of resistance to the Islamic world. In some ways, the Intermarium project can be considered as a successor of the Habsburg Empire. Under such circumstances Serbia's rapprochement with the Intermarium is able to deactualize "anti-Latin" sentiments, inherent for Serbs. In some ways, the Intermarium project can be considered as a successor of the Habsburg Empire. Under such circumstances Serbia's rapprochement with the Intermarium will be able to deactualize "anti-Latin" sentiments, inherent for Serbs (that  is the core reason of their confrontation with Croats) and will enable them become a part of an integrated (despite its mosaic) civilizational space.

The above is applies to hypothetical plane, and this is impossible to predict the official Belgrad's further actions regarding the integration processes in Central and Eastern Europe. But there are two apparent things. First, Serbia's involvement in integration process is quite desirable. Secondly, this is disadvantageous for Serbs to cherish excessive hopes on Moscow, as well as to become another puppet of Brussels.

by Igor Zagrebelny