UKRAINE-POLAND: THE COMPLEXITY OF THE HISTORICAL DIALOGUE

Despite the enormous range of common interests between Ukraine and Poland, the historic dialogue continues to be the biggest stumbling block. And even if it brings some results, they often don't match the expectations of one or the other party.

The most popular argument of Warsaw is that contemporal Ukrainian-Polish relations must be built on historical truth and justice. No one denies that the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue should be based on truth and justice. However, it seeems that some representatives of the Polish side - in particular, the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry Witold Vaschikovsky - have their own approach to the issue of historical justice. 

Poles are offended by the OUN-UPA cult in Ukraine, although it has nothing to do with polonophobia. At the same time, everitime when Ukrainians claim their historical emotions, Poland immediately finds reasons why their emotions are more "weighty and just." The latest incident took place in Lviv when Witold Vaschikovsky refused to enter  the "Prison on Lontsky" Museum, because of the director's opinion that Poland occupied Ukraine in 1918.

The point is not even Vaschikovsky's behavior, but in the fact that the Polish side seems doesn't need historical justice at all. Starting from the presidency of Kuchma and Kwasniewski, every successive president of Ukraine took part in the actions of Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation. Subsequently, similar actions were held by Ukrainian and Polish nationalists, after which all historical grievances had been left behind in favor of building positively new bilateral relations. 

Poles are offended when we recall the occupation. However, they allow themselves to call all the Ukraine independence fighters of the XX cent. criminals, regardless of whether or not these people committed the crimes, they have been accused of, from the point of international law.

The history of the OUN-UPA does not begin in 1943, so the demands to renounce the historical heritage of these formations are completely groundless. Moscow-promoted principle of comparing the OUN-UPA with the Nazis cannot be fit here, since Stepan Bandera - who used to live in Munich legally - wasn't involved to the Nuremberg Tribunal. 

Continuing the theme of glorification of war criminals - as the Polish side likes to say - it would be fair to say that not everything is as smooth as the Polish side pretending it is. For example, there are many such historical figures as Joseph "Volyniak" Zajersky - who carved all Ukrainians in Piskorovichi village - are honored in Poland. Nevertheless, the fact of mass killing of Ukrainian civilians does not prevent Poland from placing memorial plaques to the murderer and war criminal.

The second figure is Josef Bees, a man who once committed a massacre in the Ukrainian village of Pawlokoma, yet no one has heard apologies or condemnation of such actions from Poland. 

Another 'striking  example' is the Polish anti-Communist partisan Zygmunt "Lupaszka" Szendzielarz, who had carved Lithuanian villages, not even sparing women and children. But President Andrzej Duda and Polish Defense Minister Antoni Machierevich do not count on the historical emotions of Lithuanians, but they honor those whom they consider to be their heroes, as evidenced by at least the fact that both the president and the defense minister attended the official reburial of Lupaszka.

All of these figures are mentioned not in the context of historical claims to Poles, but only to emphasize once again that no people will agree to learn own history from books written by his neighbor.

Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych are heroes for Ukrainians, yet they aren't so for Poles. After all, we haven't even demanded Poles to recognize officially the OUN-UPA as heroes in Poland, why do the Poles impose Ukrainians in their territory to recognize OUN-UPA as historical criminals?

Loud statements and threats of denying entry to those whose point of view does converge with Polish position will only lead to symmetric actions on the part of Ukraine. The situation in which the Ukrainian-Polish relations are found themselves now is a typical example of positional bargaining, where everyone defends his position instead of work over a problem resolution and look for a solution that is beneficial to both sides.

As for Ukraine, there is no guarantee that after the OUN-UPA, Poland will not find another 'historical problem' in the Sich Riflemen, who attempted to restore Ukrainian orderd in Lviv. And after them they will not insist the abandonment of the Cossack heritage and the voluntary recognition of Ukraine as a rebellious Polish province.

That is why it is necessary to give rest to the deceased and start working on building a historical dialogue based on truth and justice, not on one-sided claims, as it is now.

the Natsionalny Corpus